Naval Arms Race

The Second London Naval Treaty (1936)

The Second London Naval Treaty of 1936 set limits on battleships, cruisers and submarines, explains why Japan and Italy stayed out, and how war ended it.

On this page
  1. What the Second London Naval Treaty was
  2. How the 1936 talks came about
  3. Who signed and who stayed out
  4. The main limits
  5. The escalator clause and the 1938 change
  6. Submarines and the 1936 protocol
  7. Why the treaty failed
  8. When Japan and the Washington system collapsed
  9. Why it still matters

What the Second London Naval Treaty was

The Second London Naval Treaty was signed on 25 March 1936 by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It was the last major attempt to limit warship sizes and gun calibres before the Second World War. Its limits lapsed when war began in September 1939.

It followed the 1930 London Naval Treaty and was negotiated at a conference that opened in London on 9 December 1935. The aim was to limit naval armaments until the treaty expired in 1942. The talks were not wholly successful, because two major naval powers stayed out.

How the 1936 talks came about

By the mid-1930s the interwar limits were under strain. Japan wanted parity with the United States and Britain. When its demand for a common upper limit was refused, Japan withdrew from the conference on 15 January 1936.

Britain had already reached its own deal with Germany. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 1935 allowed Germany a navy up to 35 percent of British surface tonnage. That agreement sat uneasily alongside the wider effort to limit warships and showed how far the naval order had weakened.

Who signed and who stayed out

The three signatories were France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Japan left the talks before signing. Italy declined to sign, largely because of the hostility that followed its invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and the international sanctions that came with it. Germany was not a party to the treaty.

The main limits

The treaty set size and gun limits for the main warship types rather than limiting the total number of ships each navy could build. The key numbers were:

  • Capital ships (battleships): a standard displacement of 35,000 tons and main guns of 14 inches.
  • Aircraft carriers: 23,000 tons.
  • Light cruisers: 8,000 tons, with guns of 6.1 inches or smaller.
  • Submarines: 2,000 tons, with guns of 5.1 inches or smaller.

The 14-inch gun limit was tighter than the 16-inch cap set in 1922.

The escalator clause and the 1938 change

The treaty included an escalator clause. If Japan or Italy had not signed by 1 April 1937, the signatories could raise their gun calibres above 14 inches, up to 16 inches. The United States used the clause to complete the North Carolina class with 16-inch guns.

In 1938 the signatories agreed to raise the capital-ship displacement limit to 45,000 tons. The Iowa-class battleships, built in the early 1940s, were designed around that higher limit. Few of the treaty’s limits survived the outbreak of war, but the escalator clause shows how the parties tried to keep the agreement workable as other powers rearmed.

Submarines and the 1936 protocol

The 1930 London Naval Treaty had required submarines to follow the same rules as surface warships when they stopped and searched merchant ships. Merchant ships could be sunk only after their crews and passengers were placed in a place of safety. That rule was reaffirmed in the 1936 talks through a separate protocol, signed on 6 November 1936. Over time, a long list of other nations adhered to it.

The rules were hard to apply in wartime. Once war began in 1939, they were widely disregarded in the submarine campaigns that followed.

Why the treaty failed

Several factors worked against the treaty:

  • Japan’s exit. Japan had decided to build outside the treaty system, and it later did so with the Yamato-class battleships (Yamato and Musashi).
  • Italy’s refusal. Italy’s war in Africa and the sanctions that followed made Rome unwilling to sign.
  • Rearmament. Germany, which was not a party, was rearming, and the other powers were under pressure to increase their own navies.
  • Growing tensions. By 1936 Japan’s expansion in China, Italy’s war in Africa, and Germany’s rearmament had made the naval limits harder to defend politically.

When Japan and the Washington system collapsed

Japan’s position hardened in 1934, when it gave notice that it would not stay bound by the naval limits after the Washington treaty’s end date of 1936. Its delegation walked out of the London talks in January 1936, and it did not sign the 1936 treaty. The 1930 London treaty was due to end on 31 December 1936, and the multilateral limits effectively collapsed with it.

The 1936 treaty was therefore a partial agreement. It kept the signatories’ limits in place for a short time, but it could not restore the broad system that the 1922 and 1930 treaties had set out. For the earlier agreements, see the Five-Power treaty and the 1930 London Naval Treaty.

Why it still matters

The Second London Naval Treaty is often seen as the end of the interwar attempt to limit battleships by agreement. Its failure showed how difficult it was to control naval building once the major powers had decided that security required larger fleets. The Anglo-German naval race before 1914 had shown a similar pattern.

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